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The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also known as the Waxman-Hatch Act, was established to restore effective patent terms, which had eroded in fact over the years due to more complicated and time-consuming approval procedures, and improve generic competition by eliminating the entry frontier of duplicative testing required in support of generic substitutes. Under the new legislation, generic entrants only needed to submit an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) that demonstrates the bioequivalence of its drug to the original. The innovators were able to recoup part of their loss caused by unequivocal regulatory delay after 1962. The introduction of Waxman-Hatch act, accompanied by the closing of patents on divers high-sales-volume brand name drugs, has altered the competitive dynamics of the pharmaceutical marketplace.

During 1980s the share of generic prescription drugs sold by retail pharmacies roughly doubled. However, the prices for name brand name drugs rose in response to generic entry. Such a price effect diverges from the standard analysis of dominant-firm-competitive-fringe model, and entirely negates the purpose of competition. Many economists have in the offing been intensely studying the bazaar structure of pharmaceutical industry in effort to explain this surprising phenomenon. My obligation in this disquisition is to pucker results from times gone by researches, and modify the paragon dominant-firm-competitive-fringe model with calculations from Caves et al. (1991), and mainly from Frank & Salkever (1992) in order to well-advised reflect the case.

Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz (1991) studied thirty drugs that went off patent protection between 1976 and 1987. Of the thirty drugs, the patents of seven expired before 1980, sixteen between 1980 and 1984, and seven after 1984. The data in Table 1 covers several larger medicinal drug classes including, cardiovascular (11), psychotherapeutic (7), systemic anti-infective (4), diabetes therapy (4), antiarthritics (2), diuretics (1), and antispasmodics (1). The bottom columns of table 1 provide the average cumulative number of generic ANDAs approved during a given number of years after the patents expired, and the market share of generic products in the same period.

Grabowski and Vernon (1992) later investigated the arrive d enter a occur into force of generic entry on prices for 18 high-sales-volume pharmaceutical products that were first exposed to generic competition during the years of 1983 through 1987. For each opiate, the authors examined prices prior to entry-way and prices one year following generic entry. They concluded that increasing the horde of generic entrants had a strong downward effect on generic prices reliant on to brand-name prices; in particular, the generic-brand name toll ratio was estimated to fall from 0.599 to 0.201 as the number of generic entrants increases from 1 to 20.

G = Generic, B =Brand name

Figure 2: Graphic Interpretation of Table 2

Year

To concur with Grabowski and Vernon’s results, Frank and Salkever (1997) found that brand name prices increased more quickly than in markets without generic entry. Their reason was that as the price-sensitive consumers switch to generic drugs, demand for the original brand-name drug declines and becomes less sensitive to price. Thus, the price of a brand name medicine can theoretically rise more quickly over time than it would keep without generic competition.

Frank and Salkever developed a model using past empirical data, which theorizes an apparent correlation between generic entry and brand name price levels. In their analysis, the demand side of the market for a particular drug is differentiated by two types of consumers: those who face high switching costs and exhibit strong preferences in the direction of the brand name drug, and those who are more price-sensitive and exhibit insignificant switching costs. The insensitive component might consist of the patients of physicians in fee-for-service practices; those consumers pay high insurance premiums each period, and enjoy a complete coverage on most of the medical resources. And the sensitive component consists of enrollees in HMOs and similar fitness insurance services. In this model, consumers are risk-averse and tend to reuse the medicines that suit them with complete safety instead of alluring a gamble on trying new drugs. Entry of generics will capture a large part of the price sensitive buyers, and leave all price insensitive buyers to purchase brand-name products. This causes the brand name producers’ demand function to shift inward and to become less elastic, which allows the profit-maximizing brand name firms to raise its price.

The model assumes that the stigmatize name drug producer behaves as a Stackelberg figure leader, in which the leader obtains first mover advantage from patent protection in the first period. The brand name drug producer becomes the dominant firm that makes its profit-maximizing pricing decisions prepossessing into account the generic reaction in the market. Producers of generic substitutes are viewed as fringe firms playing a Nash-Bertrand non-cooperative game, and take the brand name producer’s price as given.

3.2. A simple Market Segmentation Model

The profit-maximizing brand name producers brashness the segmented demand curve: the loyal customers (D_L), and the cross-price-sensitive customers (D_S), who will switch to generic substitutes in the next period. The brand name producer’s demand function is:

Q_b = D_L(P_b) + D_S (P_b, P_g) (1)

Where Q_b is the brand name quantity demanded, P_b and P_g are the brand designate and generic prices. The brand-name demand response consists of the direct effect on the two segments of the demand function plus an indirect form of price reaction function determined by the sub-market for generics. For given values of n, as the issue of generic firm in the market, [D_L(P_b) + D_S (P_b, P_g)] will be viewed as the reduced-form demand curve for brand name drugs. And the demand function for the n identical generic firms is D_G(P_g, P_b), where P_g = P_g^*(n, P_b), P_b = P_b(n, w), and w is a vector of input price. Cost is a function of Q_b, thus stamp name firm’s profit function becomes:

_{(P ´ Qb) = Revenue – Cost}

p = P_b{D_L(P_b) + D_s [P_b, P_g^*(n, P_b)]} – C(Q_b) (2)

For given value of n, D_L(P_b) + D_s [P_b, P_g^*(n, P_b)] is the reduced-form demand curve for the brand name producer. Then, the brand specify unchangeable maximizes profit with respect to P_b, this yield the first order condition

_{D in DL + D in DS + Cross price effect = ¶Qb/¶Pb Markup}

¶p/¶P_b = 0 = [dD_L/dP_b + ¶D_S/¶P_b + (¶D_S/¶P_g)(¶P_g^*/¶P_b)][P_b - (dC/dQ_b)] + Q_b (3)

Note that the first term summarizes the demand response to change in P_b, which must be disputatious due to the slipping sloping assumption of demand curves, where price and quantity have inverse relationship.

Brand name drug producers do not face listing in the beginning, so the first days graph looks at most like the classic monopoly model, where a identify name firm produces at MC = MR. The market segmentation line demarcates the loyal consumer (D_L), who take over the top half of the demand curve due to their higher willingness to pay, from the price-sensitive consumers (D_S) that reside in the lower bottom. The segmentation line does not interfere with profit maximization at this stage, the brand reputation firm continue to price at P_b as indicated in figure 3.

The effect of generic entry on brand name price (dP_n/dn) can be secret by mapping the total differentiation of (3) first, which is the following, with SOC equals to ¶²p/¶P_b² < 0 to ensure the concavity of profit function when maximized subject to price:

0 = [dP_b (SOC) + dn (P_b – (dC/dQ_b)] (4)

[(¶²D_s/¶P_b¶P_b)(¶P_g^*/¶P_b) + (¶²D_s/¶P_g²)(¶P_g^*/¶n)(¶P_g^*/¶P_b) +

(¶D_S/¶P_g)(¶²P_g^*/¶P_b¶n) + dn(¶D_S/¶P_g)(¶P_g^*/¶n)] -

[dn (d²C/dQ_b²) (¶D_S/¶P_g)(¶P_g^*/¶n)] [dD_L/dP_b + ¶D_s/¶P_b + (¶D_S/¶P_b)]

Then rearrange (4) in order to examine the condition of market entry on dub manufacturer bonus (dP_b/dn). Express dP_b/dn as following:

_{Markup > 0}

dP_b/dn ={[P_b - (dC/dQ_b)] (5)

_{Effect of generic contestant on the slope of the reduced form demand curve}

[(¶²D_S/¶P_b¶P_g)(¶P_g^*/¶n) + (¶²D_s/¶P_g²)(¶P_g^*/¶n)(¶P_g^*/¶P_b) + (¶D_S/¶P_g)(¶²P_g^*/¶P_b¶n)]

^{< 0 < 0 < 0 0 > 0 > 0}

+ [(¶D_s/¶P_g)(¶P_g^*/¶n)] –

^{> 0 < 0}_{> 0 < 0 [ ¶Qb/¶Pb 0}

[(d²C/dQ_b²) (¶D_s/¶P_g)(¶P_g^*/¶n)][dD_L/dP_b + ¶D_s/¶P_b + (¶D_S/¶P_b)]} / -SOC

Since generic firms in the model are by assumption competitive fringe, its price falls and approaches to marginal price, when the number of generic firms (n) increases, that is (¶P_g^*/¶n) < 0. And (¶D_s/¶P_g) > 0, because generic products are, again, by assumption indecent substitutes of the brand name products. So, as Frank & Salkever concluded in their paper that dP_n/dn < 0 unless either 1) entry increases the demand for brand name drugs (¶²D_s/¶P_g² < 0, that is ¶D_s/¶P_g < 0, but ¶P_g/¶n < 0), 2) marginal costs are decreasing for the brand name drugs (d²C/dQ_b² < 0), or 3) entry makes the reduced-form demand curve less elastic (¶²P_g^*/¶P_b¶n > 0, i.e. (¶²P_g/¶P_b²)(dP_b/dn) > 0, and (¶²P_g/¶P_b²) > 0, because (¶P_g/¶P_b) > 0, so we want (dP_b/dn) > 0, too). 1) seems implausible since it would coerce generic price to agitate with entry (¶P_g/¶n > 0) or brand name demand falls when generic prices rises (¶D_s/¶P_g < 0), which implies that the two products are gross compliment in demand. This second possibility was rejected because Frank & Salkever claimed that “little systematic empirical work on the nature of returns to scale has been reported”. And if the pharmaceutical industry has decreasing marginal cost, the industry will come close to a natural monopoly, which is seldom the case in reality. This leaves the third possibility: entry makes the reduced-form demand curve steeper, as the most plausible explanation for dP_b/dn > 0. To show this on a graph:

As generic firms on to enter the market in the second period after the patent expires, the generic demand (D_g) takes away part of brand name firm’s consumers and causes the demand for trade-mark name products become more inelastic according to Frank & Salkever’s calculation, so the price sensitive part of the reduced-form demand curve (D_s) pivots in (D_s’). As a result, the brand name producer maximizes its split second period profit with respect to the modish marginal revenue curve (MR’). And because now the brand name firm is facing a more inelastic demand than the first period, it will supply at higher price (P_b’) to extract consumer surplus.

Frank & Salkever’s analysis deviates from the first-rate dominant-firm-competitive-fringe model because of the clear demand market segmentations that look in pharmaceutical markets, where each category of drugs have a group of loyal customers with high switching costs, and the essential mover advantage provided by patent safe keeping. To fully observe the influence of high switching costs in the market, I need to modify the classic pattern on a bit. If I relax the market-clearing price assumption to allow the dominant firm and competitive fringes to do battle with different prices; and I impose a uniform marginal cost curve for all, instead of the classic interpretation that the dominant firm obtains its semi-monopolistic position due to efficiency, then we can see the impression of “loyal consumers”.

This modified version shows that the price of a brand name drug will definitely taper off upon generic entry, because generic firms will capture the upper corner of on request, therefore reducing the consumers’ willingness to pay at high prices. Switching costs in the market segmentation model are created mostly by fee-for-service health insurance policies, which provide complete medical coverage once the customers pay a high premium. Consumers that enroll in such cover policies will inevitably have less provocation to choose a cheaper generic substitute, and their behaviors will be dictated by moral hazard, which results in wasting social resources and impedes vend efficiency.

3.3 Effect of Generic Entry on Brand Name Advertising

As an extension of the basic model, Frank & Salkever advanced their research in exploring the deterioration of brand name advertising expenditure, which had presumably been linked to generic entry according to many past empiric evidences. Advertising generally serves two purposes. Most informational advertising aims to improve consumer knowledge, thus increasing demand to save a class of pharmaceuticals, or increasing the customer acceptance wanted for a specific artefact if there exist true quality differentials that can be publicized. However, the brand name manufacturers are well aware that if they advertise to increase the aggregate demand for the class of drug, the placard might generate confess atop of effect, that is, the brand name advertising mightiness attract consumers championing the generic entrants, who would appropriate the benefit without incurring any cost. The brand name firm is basically incapable of increasing the demand specifically for its own product, because generic drugs are by assumption excellent substitutes with bioquivalency approvals. If the trade-mark name manufacturers advertise primarily to differentiate their products from generic substitutes, it may trigger an opposite effect; it may diminish the cross-price sensitivity of its own demand (D_S), and therefore reduce the size of the demand response to going in. In figure 6, notice the new market segmentation inscribe is moved towards the honestly, because the price sensitivity is being reduced around informational advertising, and now, the price-sensitive segment of consumers becomes less good. In fact, these price-sensitive consumers did not cause any changes on MR within the significant order, because MR’ is below the axis. The brand name firm will still maximize its profit with respect to the knowledgeable marginal revenue curve, but with higher a marginal cost curve generated by advertising expenditure, such as packaging.

Lower levels of advertising reflect treatment innovators’ concerns about subsequent lower returns from such investments once patents expire and generic entry grows proper.

4. Conclusion

The entry effect on brand name pharmaceutical products in this analysis is based on the assumption that brand big cheese producers mimic an optimal behavior principal, in which the firms profit-maximize with sought after curves subject to generic entry. The necessary conditions to cause brand name prices to burgeon simultaneously as advertising expenditures to decrease in response to generic entry are: 1) the listing leads to a substantial decline in price elasticity of reduce-form maker name demand, and 2) market-expanding advertising reduces the cross-price-sensitive segment of manufacturer celebrity demand curve. Such an outcome leads to several observations regarding the pricing pattern in this market. First, it appears that as the number of generic entries increases, the competition among generic drug producers becomes fierce, and eventually forces generic deaden prices to approach the market unwasteful point. Second, increasing generic competition is not necessarily accompanied by lower prices in discredit name drugs.

However, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration of 1984 did not quite fail its expectations. Evidence has shown a 40 to 50% shift in market share from brand luminary producers to generic firms, along with a 25 to 30% reduction in generic drug price. That means, even though the price of brand name drugs rises when their generic substitutes are introduced, the average price of the prescription drugs fall, and the trend of name-brand price increase will be attenuated as the cross-price-sensitive segment of the market continues to expand.

Thus, the moral of the story is not to condemn generic competition, but to elucidate switching costs in consumer behavior as a form of market failure caused by imperfect information. Switching costs are incurred when consumers are ignorant of the bioequivalency of generic substitutes. Policy makers should focus on eroding switching costs by educating consumers.

Bibliography:

Aronsson, Thomas, Mats A. Bergmand, Niklas Rudholm. (1997), “The Impact of Generic Competition on Brand Name Market Shares – Evidence from Micro Data”, , Department of Economics, University of Ume, Sweden.

Caves, Richard E., Michael D. Whinston, Mark A. Hurwitz, (1992), “Patent Expiration, Entry and Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry: An Exploratory Analysis”, , Vol. 1991. (1991), pp. 1-48.

Frank, Richard G., David S. Salkever. (1992) “Pricing, Patent Loss and the Market for Pharmaceuticals”, , 59, 165-179.

– (1997), “Generic Entry and the Pricing for Pharmaceuticals”, , 6(1), 75-90.

Grabowski, Henry, John Vernon, (1992), “Brand Loyalty, Entry and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act ”, , 35, 331-350.

Klemperer, Paul. (1995), “Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International trade”, 62, 515-539

Merino-Castelló, Anna (2000), “The Impact of the Reference Price System on the Pharmaceutical Market: A theoretical Approach”, , Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.